DO DEGREES CREATE COMBAT LEADERS? FROM YESTERDAY'S CONTINENTAL ARMY, TO KANDAHAR TODAY, RAJIV ASSERTS THE WORTH OF MILITARY ACADEMIES.
At the peak of the day’s sunshine, fifty miles north of New York City, I perch myself upon a stone wall on the western bank of the Hudson River. The scene is absolutely breathtaking. Relics of wars past—canons, statues—line the gardens that flank me. Thin streaks of clouds make it difficult to see where the green rolling hills end, and the penetrating blue sky begins. It has been nearly seven years since my relationship with this highland fortress had begun.
For much of its 209-year history, West Point and her sister federal service academies have been the predominant source of junior officer leadership for the United States Armed Forces. But upon the increased development of programs like Officer Candidate School (OCS) and the Reserve Officer Training (ROTC), the value proposition of the service academies is being sharply challenged—and rightfully so. While the average ROTC cadet can be commissioned for less than $300,000, the West Point education is currently valued at nearly $450,000 per cadet, with similar costs in the Navy and Air Force Academies.
The cost of maintaining each of these institutions replicates the costs of maintaining a modern military post—barracks, utilities, construction and security—at the expense of the taxpayer. In a time of such economic instability, who can justify such excess costs, especially when the graduates of ROTC and OCS continue to wear the exact same second lieutenant bars on their shoulder as their Academy counterparts? Especially when the combat performance of Academy graduates has yet to be empirically proven superior? There is absolutely no conclusive evidence to show that Academy graduates are more capable leaders than ROTC Lieutenants. And yet, both types of training have merit.
In the past, American service academies were not considered to be institutions designed to produce Lieutenants and Captains; but rather, Colonels and Generals who would command the future of our military. But as a decade of fierce war continues in Afghanistan and Iraq, the recent departure rate of West Point officers has become staggering: Over 52% leave the force after the minimum five-year active duty requirement.
In generations before mine, cadets spent much of their time laboring in engineering or even equestrian classes. Today, each cadet is required to take four semesters of a foreign language, international relations, American politics, economics and a plethora of other intellectually-focused courses geared to prepare young leaders for the art of nation building. During summer training, the massive field movements of the past have turned into urban simulations, local national engagements and IED reaction drills. It was West Point that led the way in developing—and, more importantly, implementing—these adaptations in tactical training.
In order to make a full assessment of Academy training and its value, I will examine the historical role that West Point—the oldest of the service academies—has played in American conflict, from the civil war to the Global War on Terror. I will outline the composition and training of its graduates, along with comparative analysis of their ROTC and OCS counterparts, in order to determine if there is any way to truly qualify that one type of training produces better leaders. Finally, I will analyze American military and counterinsurgency policy from a strategic point of view to revalidate the value proposition of West Point, Annapolis and Colorado Springs.
II. BEGINNINGS
After winning independence, the new federal government of the United States acquired the land in New York that would become West Point in 1790. President George Washington proposed a national military academy and several Revolutionary War veterans advocated for West Point as the site of such an institution. In his last official letter, written in 1798, Washington wrote that the establishment of a military academy was “an object of primary importance to this country.”
But when the War of 1812 caught the nation off guard: militias were not at volume, and the spirit of volunteerism common during the American Revolution had weakened. It was then that West Point and its Corps of Engineers stopped building the country, and started defending it. One of the most dynamic West Point graduates to influence the war at this time was a graduate named Sylvanius Thayer.
Thayer studied for three years at Dartmouth College—but rather than graduate there, he received an honorary appointment to West Point. He graduated in one year and was commissioned as a Lieutenant. At a time when the infrastructure of the United States Navy was far inferior to its British opponent, Thayer was responsible for designing and constructing the Norfolk naval station. Norfolk would eventually become headquarters of the first major fleet in the U.S. Navy. When promoted to Major in 1815, Thayer was offered a $5,000 stipend to travel to France to continue his studies in engineering and mathematics. Soon after Thayer’s return, President James Monroe ordered him to return to West Point and serve as its Superintendent, promoting him to the rank of Colonel in 1818.
It wasn’t until Colonel Sylvanias Thayer became the Academy’s superintendent that its rigid curriculum structure took shape: a core design of not only math and science classes, but also studies in English, equestrianism, military science and language. Today, while the content of Academy courses is not necessarily consistent with that of two centuries ago; Thayer's legacy survives in an ethos of self-taught learning. Cadets refer to “the Thayer method”: a learning process by which cadets teach themselves the content for the next lesson. This ensures that actual class time is maximized for receiving clarification on lesson content, or refining new skill sets. This self-resourcing, quintessential to combat leadership, represents the academic value inherent to a military academy education.
III. CHANGES
When the Civil War began in 1861, it was a time of dire confusion for West Point cadets and graduates. Which side would their senior officers take? Generals Ulysses S. Grant and George McClellan remained loyal to the Union, while Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee chose the Confederacy. At a time when state allegiance was a more defining identity than American nationality, graduates of the service academy were compelled to create new patriotic identities in order to serve the political will of their time. It wasn’t until the first and second World Wars, however, that the dominance of West Point was challenged. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was regarded as a plausible concept for the mass commissioning of officers in wartime as early as 1871. Records from Norwich Academy in Northfield, VT show that students had been asked—even if not mandated—to participate in military training in order to maintain military preparedness amongst fighting-aged males for the selective service.
The Infantry Officer Candidate School, now known as the OCS, developed in 1941 when a drastic disparity between the supply of, and demand for junior military officers became apparent.
The first OCS class began with 207 candidates. While the four-year West Point and ROTC experiences were filled with a degree of progression, academic rigor and military training, OCS classes squeezed the entire commissioning experience into an eight-week program. The first class graduated 174 second lieutenants, all of whom deployed to combat within one year of graduation. The expedience of the OCS production method proved to be an exceptional means of delivering large batches of junior officers in a short amount of time.
In the vast majority of countries where a national security threat to the United States persists, few such institutions exist. It is therefore to our advantage to advocate for future leaders and innovators of each such nation to be trained in the West Point model. This method inculcates a national loyalty in the best and brightest of these nations, so that national progress becomes a target goal of their most eligible leaders.
IV. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
Today’s wars know no front lines. They don’t know uniforms. They don’t particularly know nationality. In the modern warfare that sprung from the wake of the September 11th attacks, the United States and her allies find themselves deploying forces in a multitude of directions; between Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and the Horn of Africa, along with an array of humanitarian missions in Japan, Haiti and Chile. These challenges stretch military resources—both human and financial—to the point where political will alone cannot sustain offensive missions in foreign lands.
The vast majority of current military doctrine is formulated with the goal of taking and holding land. But when the enemy is able to operate in decentralized cells—practically franchised—the strategic hope is not that the United States and her allies maintain an offensive presence in whichever unstable nation belligerent groups may displace to next. Rather, the reformulated strategy demands that host-nation militaries be developed to provide the law enforcement necessary to deny terrain from such belligerent activity. This minimizes the necessity of a global reach for the United States and more equitably divides the responsibility for international security.
For example, when the National Military Academy of Afghanistan was founded, it was Majors and Colonels from the West Point Tactical Officer department who served as the primary advisors for its development. The advisors provided specific guidance on what a day in the life of an Afghan cadet should resemble: early mornings, targeted fitness training and academic rigors. West Point sets an example by which countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia or Egypt can implement both military training and academics in the same institution, channeling all efforts towards the improvement of their nations.
Now, what if these countries used the Sandhurst (or OCS) model to develop their professional officer corps? The Sandhurst or OCS model works wonderfully when a nation already hosts academic institutions, from which an officer may obtain a solid education. But in countries with under-developed educational systems, such as Afghanistan, the literacy rates for most adults is between 25%-30%. And much the rest of the world cannot access a four-year college degree similar to those obtained in Great Britain and the United States. The four-year, combination academic-and-military West Point model is simply the best we can offer these developing militaries.
One may argue for splitting the investment from the aggregate cost of producing a service academy to instead creating one civilian university for the entire population, and a separate, military-intensive model. This would be tantamount for founding a Harvard and a Sandhurst in the same country.
But in this model, a nation must expend even more resources up front. If the government pays for founding a civilian university in addition to nearly two years at a Sandhurst or OCS model academy, the country would end up paying (and waiting) for up to six years of education to commission a single Lieutenant. This is far less economical than four years at an Academy. Furthermore, there is always a risk of brain drain from the nation’s educated graduates immigrating to higher-paying, more-developed nations. There is no guarantee that, after their using new Harvard, a nation’s human capital would choose to remain within their vulnerable nation.
V. SOCIAL INTERVENTION
"…The military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies." —Majority Supreme Court Decision in Grutter v. Bollinger
From its establishment, admission to West Point has required a nomination from a member of Congress. Each congressman, senator, and the vice president were authorized vacancies from their district, and allowed up to ten nominations for each vacancy. Though some areas of the country produced more qualified and interested applicants than others, the sharing of nominations between districts was prohibited. This was despite less-qualified candidates potentially receiving easier admittance from the less-competitive districts, while more-qualified candidates were denied admission in more-competitive districts.
The first West Point superintendent, Colonel Thayer, defended this process, citing the necessity of the military’s officer corps reflecting an equal cross-section of its soldier corps from across the country.
There is no doubt that the service academies accept lower scores in all methods of appraisal for admission of underrepresented minorities. This is an area where the ROTC and OCS programs are not judged on similar playing fields. Their competitive scholarship procedures are far more individualized than university admissions and scholarship criteria. This means that applicants to ROTC and OCS programs are not necessarily competing for their scholarship funds against a national pool of candidates. This prevents any attempt on meeting composition goals for the armed services via the ROTC or OCS programs. However, the service academies have led the way in progressively establishing priority percentage goals for the ethnic makeup of graduating classes.
Numerous generals and civilian defense leaders have defended affirmative action, maintaining that the United States military is not a typical “9-5” job. Because of the 24/7 nature of the job, the army needs leaders who understand ethnic social tension. There are no weekends in war, no days off and no easy days or nights. In an atmosphere that comprehensively dictates every aspect of a soldiers’ life, the issue of race has no other outlet but in the workplace. The academies do not admit cadets because of ethnicity, but because they see an advantage in a candidate’s ability to understand ethnicity—and the unique role it plays in grueling military social dynamics. I am not embarrassed of my Academy for attempting to produce an officer corps that is ethnically representative of the soldiers and NCOs it leads.
More importantly, most platoon leaders spend their days introducing democratic values to conservative tribal hierarchies in unstable lands like Iraq and Afghanistan. Ethnic minority officers are visible symbols to local nationals observing the U.S. military. This has value in and of itself. As the primary ambassador of American culture to the populations of these countries, it is important that the military is observed engaging professionally with colleagues of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. It is difficult to tell a tribal elder that mixing ethnic counterparts can yield a wider economic result. It is far more effective to show him this idea via the teamwork necessitated by one’s platoon command structure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Secondly, while military appraisal systems commonly using metrics to assess superiority, the method by which an officer is commissioned is not something that can be deemed “better” or “worse.” Rather, just different. Different types of resources—invested in our officer corps through ROTC, OCS and the service academies—do indeed yield different types of leaders. ROTC cadets tend to be more socially aware, as they’ve had the opportunity to live a civilian life during their four years of college. They also bring unique and interesting disciplinary majors to the table that the military academy cannot offer. At the same time, West Point graduates offer a deeper sense of community, as they’ve lived the Army fraternity for four years. But at the end of the day, each commissioning source produces a wide array and diverse set of leaders.
At the peak of the day’s sunshine, fifty miles north of New York City, I perch myself upon a stone wall on the western bank of the Hudson River. The scene is absolutely breathtaking. Relics of wars past—canons, statues—line the gardens that flank me. Thin streaks of clouds make it difficult to see where the green rolling hills end, and the penetrating blue sky begins. It has been nearly seven years since my relationship with this highland fortress had begun.
There is absolutely no conclusive evidence to show that Academy graduates are more capable leaders than ROTC Lieutenants.
The beauty of West Point had escaped me until now; but I suppose that’s to be expected when I spent the better part of my time here buried in either books or dirt, trying to understand how to become a combat leader.For much of its 209-year history, West Point and her sister federal service academies have been the predominant source of junior officer leadership for the United States Armed Forces. But upon the increased development of programs like Officer Candidate School (OCS) and the Reserve Officer Training (ROTC), the value proposition of the service academies is being sharply challenged—and rightfully so. While the average ROTC cadet can be commissioned for less than $300,000, the West Point education is currently valued at nearly $450,000 per cadet, with similar costs in the Navy and Air Force Academies.
The cost of maintaining each of these institutions replicates the costs of maintaining a modern military post—barracks, utilities, construction and security—at the expense of the taxpayer. In a time of such economic instability, who can justify such excess costs, especially when the graduates of ROTC and OCS continue to wear the exact same second lieutenant bars on their shoulder as their Academy counterparts? Especially when the combat performance of Academy graduates has yet to be empirically proven superior? There is absolutely no conclusive evidence to show that Academy graduates are more capable leaders than ROTC Lieutenants. And yet, both types of training have merit.
In the past, American service academies were not considered to be institutions designed to produce Lieutenants and Captains; but rather, Colonels and Generals who would command the future of our military. But as a decade of fierce war continues in Afghanistan and Iraq, the recent departure rate of West Point officers has become staggering: Over 52% leave the force after the minimum five-year active duty requirement.
Over 52% leave the force after the minimum five-year active duty requirement.
In a post-Vietnam era, it is difficult to point constructive criticism at the military without incurring an unpatriotic stigma. Academics—such as defense writer Tom Ricks, and Naval Academy professor Bruce Fleming—recently cried for the closure of the service academies by citing the loss of their founding value proposition. Most American readers responded to these gentlemen as if they were unappreciative of the Academy graduates’ great sacrifices. But I prefer a substantive discussion about the utility of the service academies, best begun with the admission that the gentlemen are correct: West Point no longer serves the historic purpose upon which it was founded. That does not imply, however, that West Point has become obsolete. Rather, its purposes have morphed according the needs of today’s asymmetric fight.In generations before mine, cadets spent much of their time laboring in engineering or even equestrian classes. Today, each cadet is required to take four semesters of a foreign language, international relations, American politics, economics and a plethora of other intellectually-focused courses geared to prepare young leaders for the art of nation building. During summer training, the massive field movements of the past have turned into urban simulations, local national engagements and IED reaction drills. It was West Point that led the way in developing—and, more importantly, implementing—these adaptations in tactical training.
Massive field movements of the past have turned into urban simulations, local national engagements and IED reaction drills.
This new value proposition is seldom, if ever, asserted.In order to make a full assessment of Academy training and its value, I will examine the historical role that West Point—the oldest of the service academies—has played in American conflict, from the civil war to the Global War on Terror. I will outline the composition and training of its graduates, along with comparative analysis of their ROTC and OCS counterparts, in order to determine if there is any way to truly qualify that one type of training produces better leaders. Finally, I will analyze American military and counterinsurgency policy from a strategic point of view to revalidate the value proposition of West Point, Annapolis and Colorado Springs.
II. BEGINNINGS
After winning independence, the new federal government of the United States acquired the land in New York that would become West Point in 1790. President George Washington proposed a national military academy and several Revolutionary War veterans advocated for West Point as the site of such an institution. In his last official letter, written in 1798, Washington wrote that the establishment of a military academy was “an object of primary importance to this country.”
In his last official letter, written in 1798, Washington wrote that the establishment of a military academy was “an object of primary importance to this country.”
In an 1802 decree, President Thomas Jefferson established West Point as the nation’s first school of engineering. The academy was to serve as the premier institution for civil and mechanical efforts that would urbanize and modernize the country’s energy, building and transportation infrastructure. As an avid engineer himself, Jefferson knew that development of his country could not occur without the scientific analysis necessary to produce bridges, tunnels, mining and excavation.But when the War of 1812 caught the nation off guard: militias were not at volume, and the spirit of volunteerism common during the American Revolution had weakened. It was then that West Point and its Corps of Engineers stopped building the country, and started defending it. One of the most dynamic West Point graduates to influence the war at this time was a graduate named Sylvanius Thayer.
Thayer studied for three years at Dartmouth College—but rather than graduate there, he received an honorary appointment to West Point. He graduated in one year and was commissioned as a Lieutenant. At a time when the infrastructure of the United States Navy was far inferior to its British opponent, Thayer was responsible for designing and constructing the Norfolk naval station. Norfolk would eventually become headquarters of the first major fleet in the U.S. Navy. When promoted to Major in 1815, Thayer was offered a $5,000 stipend to travel to France to continue his studies in engineering and mathematics. Soon after Thayer’s return, President James Monroe ordered him to return to West Point and serve as its Superintendent, promoting him to the rank of Colonel in 1818.
It wasn’t until Colonel Sylvanias Thayer became the Academy’s superintendent that its rigid curriculum structure took shape: a core design of not only math and science classes, but also studies in English, equestrianism, military science and language. Today, while the content of Academy courses is not necessarily consistent with that of two centuries ago; Thayer's legacy survives in an ethos of self-taught learning. Cadets refer to “the Thayer method”: a learning process by which cadets teach themselves the content for the next lesson. This ensures that actual class time is maximized for receiving clarification on lesson content, or refining new skill sets. This self-resourcing, quintessential to combat leadership, represents the academic value inherent to a military academy education.
III. CHANGES
When the Civil War began in 1861, it was a time of dire confusion for West Point cadets and graduates. Which side would their senior officers take? Generals Ulysses S. Grant and George McClellan remained loyal to the Union, while Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee chose the Confederacy. At a time when state allegiance was a more defining identity than American nationality, graduates of the service academy were compelled to create new patriotic identities in order to serve the political will of their time. It wasn’t until the first and second World Wars, however, that the dominance of West Point was challenged. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was regarded as a plausible concept for the mass commissioning of officers in wartime as early as 1871. Records from Norwich Academy in Northfield, VT show that students had been asked—even if not mandated—to participate in military training in order to maintain military preparedness amongst fighting-aged males for the selective service.
It wasn't until 1963, during the early stages of the Vietnam War, that the concept of choice was offered to candidates in ROTC.
For generations of ROTC cadets, the path of active or reserve service was not a choice, but rather a mandate based upon the needs of the military during the two World Wars and the Korean War. It wasn’t until 1963, during the early stages of the Vietnam War, that the concept of choice was offered to candidates in ROTC. They could either pursue a reserve commission, or accept the remaining officer positions unoccupied by their West Point counterparts.The Infantry Officer Candidate School, now known as the OCS, developed in 1941 when a drastic disparity between the supply of, and demand for junior military officers became apparent.
The first OCS class began with 207 candidates. While the four-year West Point and ROTC experiences were filled with a degree of progression, academic rigor and military training, OCS classes squeezed the entire commissioning experience into an eight-week program. The first class graduated 174 second lieutenants, all of whom deployed to combat within one year of graduation. The expedience of the OCS production method proved to be an exceptional means of delivering large batches of junior officers in a short amount of time.
This method inculcates a national loyalty in the best and brightest of these nations.
While the OCS experience appears germane to the arguments posed by Fleming and Ricks, it’s important to realize that the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy of Great Britain was the inspiration for the OCS model. At Sandhurst, no formal education is provided. 85% of cadets arrive with bachelor’s degrees and endure 12 months of intensive officer training. The training experience there is far less expensive, and arguably just as effective. However, the Sandhurst model requires the preexistence of rigorous four-year college and university programs to first prepare candidates for intensive officership, and for leadership in strategic-level environments.In the vast majority of countries where a national security threat to the United States persists, few such institutions exist. It is therefore to our advantage to advocate for future leaders and innovators of each such nation to be trained in the West Point model. This method inculcates a national loyalty in the best and brightest of these nations, so that national progress becomes a target goal of their most eligible leaders.
IV. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
Today’s wars know no front lines. They don’t know uniforms. They don’t particularly know nationality. In the modern warfare that sprung from the wake of the September 11th attacks, the United States and her allies find themselves deploying forces in a multitude of directions; between Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and the Horn of Africa, along with an array of humanitarian missions in Japan, Haiti and Chile. These challenges stretch military resources—both human and financial—to the point where political will alone cannot sustain offensive missions in foreign lands.
The vast majority of current military doctrine is formulated with the goal of taking and holding land. But when the enemy is able to operate in decentralized cells—practically franchised—the strategic hope is not that the United States and her allies maintain an offensive presence in whichever unstable nation belligerent groups may displace to next. Rather, the reformulated strategy demands that host-nation militaries be developed to provide the law enforcement necessary to deny terrain from such belligerent activity. This minimizes the necessity of a global reach for the United States and more equitably divides the responsibility for international security.
How does a nation of strangers with only defensive guerrilla warfare experience even begin to build a competent and professional conventional army?
Our current national security relies heavily on unstable nations controlling terrorist activity within their borders. But for ethnically and historically nebulous countries like Afghanistan, the profession of military officership is inconceivable. How does a nation of strangers with only defensive guerrilla warfare experience even begin to build a competent and professional conventional army? From a purely strategic point of view, the veritable military Disneyland that is West Point is a helpful model.For example, when the National Military Academy of Afghanistan was founded, it was Majors and Colonels from the West Point Tactical Officer department who served as the primary advisors for its development. The advisors provided specific guidance on what a day in the life of an Afghan cadet should resemble: early mornings, targeted fitness training and academic rigors. West Point sets an example by which countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia or Egypt can implement both military training and academics in the same institution, channeling all efforts towards the improvement of their nations.
Now, what if these countries used the Sandhurst (or OCS) model to develop their professional officer corps? The Sandhurst or OCS model works wonderfully when a nation already hosts academic institutions, from which an officer may obtain a solid education. But in countries with under-developed educational systems, such as Afghanistan, the literacy rates for most adults is between 25%-30%. And much the rest of the world cannot access a four-year college degree similar to those obtained in Great Britain and the United States. The four-year, combination academic-and-military West Point model is simply the best we can offer these developing militaries.
One may argue for splitting the investment from the aggregate cost of producing a service academy to instead creating one civilian university for the entire population, and a separate, military-intensive model. This would be tantamount for founding a Harvard and a Sandhurst in the same country.
But in this model, a nation must expend even more resources up front. If the government pays for founding a civilian university in addition to nearly two years at a Sandhurst or OCS model academy, the country would end up paying (and waiting) for up to six years of education to commission a single Lieutenant. This is far less economical than four years at an Academy. Furthermore, there is always a risk of brain drain from the nation’s educated graduates immigrating to higher-paying, more-developed nations. There is no guarantee that, after their using new Harvard, a nation’s human capital would choose to remain within their vulnerable nation.
This would be tantamount for founding a Harvard and a Sandhurst in the same country.
A few notable examples of American service academy-inspired institutions include, but are not limited to; the National Defense Academies of India, Kuwait, Mexico, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Senegal, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. India in particular has established its own Naval Academy, as well as an academy built on the Sandhurst model—the Indian Military Academy—that was founded primarily to train officers bound for its Gorkha infantry regiments.V. SOCIAL INTERVENTION
"…The military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies." —Majority Supreme Court Decision in Grutter v. Bollinger
From its establishment, admission to West Point has required a nomination from a member of Congress. Each congressman, senator, and the vice president were authorized vacancies from their district, and allowed up to ten nominations for each vacancy. Though some areas of the country produced more qualified and interested applicants than others, the sharing of nominations between districts was prohibited. This was despite less-qualified candidates potentially receiving easier admittance from the less-competitive districts, while more-qualified candidates were denied admission in more-competitive districts.
The first West Point superintendent, Colonel Thayer, defended this process, citing the necessity of the military’s officer corps reflecting an equal cross-section of its soldier corps from across the country.
There is no doubt that the service academies accept lower scores in all methods of appraisal for admission of underrepresented minorities. This is an area where the ROTC and OCS programs are not judged on similar playing fields. Their competitive scholarship procedures are far more individualized than university admissions and scholarship criteria. This means that applicants to ROTC and OCS programs are not necessarily competing for their scholarship funds against a national pool of candidates. This prevents any attempt on meeting composition goals for the armed services via the ROTC or OCS programs. However, the service academies have led the way in progressively establishing priority percentage goals for the ethnic makeup of graduating classes.
Because of the 24/7 nature of the job, the army needs leaders who understand ethnic social tension.
Considering the dire consequences a platoon leader’s decisions can have on the battlefield, the service academies’ practice of affirmative action leads many to wonder why such huge investments are made in leaders who, at least on paper, seem to have less proven potential than racial majority candidates who are not admitted.Numerous generals and civilian defense leaders have defended affirmative action, maintaining that the United States military is not a typical “9-5” job. Because of the 24/7 nature of the job, the army needs leaders who understand ethnic social tension. There are no weekends in war, no days off and no easy days or nights. In an atmosphere that comprehensively dictates every aspect of a soldiers’ life, the issue of race has no other outlet but in the workplace. The academies do not admit cadets because of ethnicity, but because they see an advantage in a candidate’s ability to understand ethnicity—and the unique role it plays in grueling military social dynamics. I am not embarrassed of my Academy for attempting to produce an officer corps that is ethnically representative of the soldiers and NCOs it leads.
More importantly, most platoon leaders spend their days introducing democratic values to conservative tribal hierarchies in unstable lands like Iraq and Afghanistan. Ethnic minority officers are visible symbols to local nationals observing the U.S. military. This has value in and of itself. As the primary ambassador of American culture to the populations of these countries, it is important that the military is observed engaging professionally with colleagues of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. It is difficult to tell a tribal elder that mixing ethnic counterparts can yield a wider economic result. It is far more effective to show him this idea via the teamwork necessitated by one’s platoon command structure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is with this notion that the service academies have adapted to a counterinsurgency and population-centric field of conflict.
The conclusions in this analysis are twofold: First, it is imperative to understand that military formations never stay the same. These must constantly adapt, just as an enemy adapts, in order to find weaknesses in fortified defenses by way of new techniques, tactics and procedures. But to change formation does not make the notion of structure obsolete. It simply requires an adaptation to current operating requirements. It is with this notion that the service academies have adapted to a counterinsurgency and population-centric field of conflict; an environment which requires more ethnically diverse leaders, as well as institutional stability to set the example for our foreign counterparts to follow in less stable nations.Secondly, while military appraisal systems commonly using metrics to assess superiority, the method by which an officer is commissioned is not something that can be deemed “better” or “worse.” Rather, just different. Different types of resources—invested in our officer corps through ROTC, OCS and the service academies—do indeed yield different types of leaders. ROTC cadets tend to be more socially aware, as they’ve had the opportunity to live a civilian life during their four years of college. They also bring unique and interesting disciplinary majors to the table that the military academy cannot offer. At the same time, West Point graduates offer a deeper sense of community, as they’ve lived the Army fraternity for four years. But at the end of the day, each commissioning source produces a wide array and diverse set of leaders.
However, it is clear that a pluralism of leadership styles enhances the inherent strength of our officer corps.
All experiences bring valuable assets to the table. And just as an ethnically diverse leadership corps best serves the visible example of military success, the effort to produce a diverse array of skill sets and leadership styles in the profession is a good way to combat the constant force of conformity that exists in a hierarchy where the word of a superior is the word of law. There is certainly no conclusive evidence to show that ROTC or West Point or OCS officers are better than the others. However, it is clear that a pluralism of leadership styles enhances the inherent strength of our officer corps. Unified, shared experiences create group-think, and group-think is one sure way to failure in an asymmetric war. The value of service academies—as one of many types of leadership training—abides as vital for both the stability of developing nations, and for the defense of the United States.